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RECENT CASES
CoNsTruoNAL LAw-Com-mncE CLAUSE-TAx ON EXPORTS. Defendant, an Oregon corporation, contracted to sell several million feet of
railroad ties to the Chinese government Pursuant to this contract,
defendant made purchases from various tie mills near Portland, Oregon,
with directions to deliver the ties to a dock in Portland. The ties were on
the dock in December, 1936, ready for loading aboard ship, but were held
up for about three months by a longshoremen's strike. During this time,
a tax was assessed against the property, which defendant refused to pay.
Held: The ties were immune from taxation by the state of Oregon, since
they were exports and also 'because they were In foreign commerce.
Multnomah County v. Dant & Russel, Inc., 75 P. (2d) 986 (Ore. 1938).
It is well settled that the mere intent to enter goods into Interstate
or foreign commerce does not immunize them from state taxation. Bacon
v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 (1913); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933).
Nor does a general tax on goods, not then intended for exportation, become transformed Into a duty on exports, or on interstate commerce
because the goods are later exported. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622
(1885). Further, the assembling of goods at a point ready for Interstate
shipment does not, unless actual delivery Is made to a carrier, put the
goods out of the state taxing power. Coe v. Tow. of Errol, 116 U. S. 517
(1886).
Even after articles have been actually launched on their way out of a
state, certain types of Interruptions may 'break the transit so as to restore
the state taxing power. Thus, state -taxes may be levied where the transit
is broken 'by the owner In order to subject the goods to a finishing process
of some sort. Bacon v. Illinois, supra; Federal Compress & Warehouse
Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17 (1934). The same Is true wwhere the owner
interrupts the transit In order to store the goods for re-sale to out-of-state
customers. Diamond Match Co. v. Village of Ontonagon, 188-IU. S. 82
(1904). In these cases the goods are brought to rest for the purposes of
the owner, and he cannot 'be heard to complain against state taxes.
A different type of case arises where the goods are brought to rest
due to the exigencies of transportation. This may be done to affect a
change in method of carriage contemplated at the time of original shipment. Thus, In Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. State of Minnesota, 272 U.
S. 469 (1925), logs were floated to a certain place and then loaded aboard
ship for carriage to the ultimate destination. Again In State -u. Ham.
mermill Paper Co., 149 Minn. 414, 184 N. W. 182 (1921), the change was
from railway transportation to water carriage. In both cases it was held
that the continuity of interstate shipment was not broken so as to subJect the goods to state taxation. Sometimes the bringing to rest in
transit comes about through unforseen physical Impossibility. Thus In
Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366, 25 A. L. R.
1195 (1922), the floating of logs to another state was temporarily halted
midway in the journey by high water. The court held that the logs
were immune from state taxation.
Assuming, in the instant case that the transit of the railroad ties had
actually begun, there is little doubt that the delay in Portland on account
of the strike comes within the class of Interruptions due to the exigencies
of transportation. The serious question In the Instant case Is whether
interstate transit had actually 'been commenced, since it was intended
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that the lumber should be shipped by vessel, and the ties had not yet
been turned over to the steamship company. Thus, no other facts appearing, it would seem by the rule expressed in Coe v. Errol, supra, that
the state of Oregon could validly lay a tax on the lumber. However, the
ties, instead of being hauled by private means to the dock in Portland,
had been delivered from various parts of Oregon by common carrier--i. e.,
by trucking companies. In view of this fact, it can be plausibly argued
in defense of the decision that the ultimate journey had begun and that
the carriage to Portland was something more than a mere preliminary
assembling of the timbers.
The authorities used by the Oregon court are not entirely convincing.
The court relied mainly on the railroad rate cases, where the problem
is to ascertain when goods are in interstate commerce so as to be subject
to the regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. This problem
is not in all respects identical with that arising where states levy taxes
on goods allegedly in interstate commerce. For example, the first case
discussed by the Oregon court is the case of Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v.
In that case, cotton
Interstate Commerce Comm., 219 U. S. 498 (1911).
was purchased throughout the state of Texas for delivery at Galveston,
where it was reprocessed and shipped out of the state. The court held
that the cotton wvas nevertheless in interstate commerce so as to be
subject to the regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. B'ut
the rule in the tax cases, as shown by Federal Compress & Warehouse Co.
v. McLean, supra, is that where the owner interrupts the transit for the
purpose of putting a finishing process on the goods, they become subject
to local taxation. Consequently, the rate cases seem to be doubtful
authority for the type of problem raised in the case under consideration.
W. C. I.
CONTRACTS FOR LIFE EMPLOYMENT-PERFORMANCE AND BREACH-CONSIDERATION.
Plaintiff left his present position and went to work for
defendant at the request of the president of the defendant company and
upon his assurance that he could work for the rest of his life. After a
few months plaintiff was laid off, and later, dismissed. Held: The employment was one at will only, there being no consideration moving to
the defendant from the employee to support a contract for life employment other than the current service. Heideman v. Tall's Travel Shops,
ic., 192 Wash. 513, 73 P. (2d) 1323 (1937).
An employment contract should be subject to the same rules and considerations as others. These rules concern themselves with a determination of the intention of the parties and an attempt to place this intention
within one of the accepted categories of legally enforceable contracts.
Contracts of employment which do not purport to be for a definite
period, or in which the period is so indefinite as to be incapable of reasonably accurate determination, are terminable at the will of either
party. I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2nd ed. 1936) § 39; 1 LABATT, MASTER AND
These contracts are unilateral, the
SERVANT (2nd ed. 1913) § 159.
performance of the service giving rise to the obligation to pay for it,
there being no promise to furnish employment and no promise to work.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 12. If the contract is one in which
the employer promises to provide employment for a definite period, and
the employee to work for that period, there is a bilateral contract, ibid;
and a breach of this agreement by either party should give rise to an
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action for damages.
If the period of employment has been expressed as being "permanent"
or "for life" the contract does not fall squarely within either of these
classes. They have been handled in different ways by the courts with
various results, .but without a thorough analysis of the type of contract
with which they were dealing. It Is commonly recognized that a contract
of this kind, if supported by consideration, will be sustained. Heaman
v. Rowell, 261 N. Y. 229, 185 N. E. 83 (1933). The cases hold that the
absence or presence of consideration is merely a factor to be considered
in the interpretation of the contract to determine, with other circumstances, whether the parties really intended that the contract should be
for life employment. Thus, where the employer promises permanent employment in consideration for the employee's giving up a claim for
damages for personal injuries, the contract is generally construed as
meaning that the employee will have a job for as long as he is able and
willing to perform and the employer has work for him to do. Such
contracts are uniformly held to be supported by adequate consideration.
Pierce v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. R. Co., 173 U. S. 1 (1899); Harringtonv.
Kansas City Cable R. Co., 60 Mo. App. 223 (1895); Louisville & Nashville
1. Co. v. Cox, 145 Ky. 667, 141 S. W. 389 (1911). A like result has been
reached in cases in which the independent consideration, aside from the
performance of the service itself, was the giving up of another position.
Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46 N. E. 117, 35 L. R. A. 512, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 488 (1897); Riefkin v. DuPont De Nenzours & Co., 290 Fed. 286 (App.
D. C. 1923). On the other hand a large number of cases hold that the giving
up of other interests and activities is not such consideration as will support a contract for life employment, this being something that almost
every desirable employee does upon entering a new service. Minter v.
Tootle, Campbell Dry Goods Co., 187 Mo. App. 16, 173 S. W. 4 (1915);
Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22 Pac. 1126 (1889); Heaman v. Rowell,
supra; Arentz v.- Morse Dry Dock Co., 249 N. Y. 439, 164 N. E. 342, 62
A. L. R. 342 (1928); Rape v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So.
585, 35 A. L. R. 1422 (1924). These cases also emphasize the fact that
the contract lacks mutuality of obligation in that the employee is not
bound to stay with the job, while the employer is bound.
It is suggested that the usual situation in which the employer requests
the service of the employee, or gives him the opportunity to work, is
not a contract, but rather an offer which becomes a contract only upon
performance of the requested service. See WiLLIsTox, CONTRACTS (2nd ed.
1936) § 36. If the parties themselves intended that the giving up of
another position, or the relinquishment of a claim for damages, should
be the act of performance on the part of the employee, and the employee
did this pursuant to the employer's request, the adequacy of this consideration should not be material. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 81.
The employer has not requested that the employee promise to continue
at the job. The failure to continue at the job or the inability of the
employer to provide work might be treated as a condition subsequent
which would terminate the liability of the employer under the contract
In much the same way as the conditions of forfeiture In insurance policies.
See VANCE ON INSURANCE (2nd ed. 1930) p. 290.
Such a treatment of these contracts could bring about reasonable
results without doing violence to the doctrine of consideration. Of
course, there would still be the difference and difficulties due to the
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various ideas on the revocability or irrevocability of offers for unilateral
contracts. The inquiry in such cases would, however, be simplified into
the following: 1. Was there a request by the employer for an act or
forbearance, other than the performance of the work, which could be
construed as an offer? 2. Did the offeree give this consideration, or a
part of it, with the intention of accepting the offer? 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2nd ed. 1936) § 65; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
§§ 45
and 46.
In the instant case it is flatly said that even if there had been evidence of a contract for life employment, the agreement would be unenforceable for want of consideration moving to the employer, other than
the rendition of services. This seems contra the established doctrine
that mere inadequacy of consideration is never a bar to the enforcement

of a contract. 1

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

(2nd ed. 1936) § 115;

RESTATEMENT,

(1932) § 81. If the employee has given up another position
at the request of the employer, he has suffered a legal detriment. It is
not necessary that the promisor receive a corresponding benefit. 1 WILCONTRACTS

LISTON, CONTRACTS

(2nd ed. 1936) § 102.

There was evidence In this case to the effect that the plaintiff did
not leave his former position -with the intention of accepting the offer
for life employment. The court could have reached its result without
inquiring into the adequacy of the consideration by saying that the offer
was not accepted.
D. W. G.
DECLARED DIVIDENDSSTATUTE Or LIMITATIONS TRusTs.
The defendant company paid dividends declared on the plaintiff's cumulative
preferred stock to a third person of the same name for a period of ten
years under a mistake of fact. Upon the application of the third party,
on grounds that the stock had been lost, the company Issued new stock
to him and paid dividends to the same third party for another ten years.
The plaintiff, ignorant of the company's action and of the fact that
dividends had ever been declared, sold his stock and upon a refusal of
the defendant to make a transfer upon the books brought this action to
recover the value of the stock and the accumulation of dividends thereon
for the past twenty years. The court in giving judgment to the plaintiff
held that the statute of limitations was not applicable on the grounds
that the corporation was a trustee as to the dividends which had been
declared. Holly Sugar Co. v. Wilson, 75 P (2d) 149 (Col. 1938).
In holding that the corporation was a trustee of the declared dividends the court reasoned that "there can be no substantial difference
between the trusteeship of a corporation as it relates to the stock of a
shareholder and its duty to him in respect to the profits or dividends
upon the stock."
Although the corporation holds the stock of its shareholders in trust,
when a dividend is declared the great weight of authority holds that
the relationship of the stockholder and the corporation as to the dividends
declared is not that of trustee and cestue que trust, but Is rather one of
debtor and creditor. The rule is very well stated in McLaren v. Cement
Planing Mill Co., 117 Mo. App. 40, 93 S. W. 819, 821 (1906) where the
court said: ". . .if a declaration of the dividend is fairly and properly
made, out of profits existing at the time It is declared, the relationship
of debtor and creditor Is thereby established between the corporation
and the stockholder for the amount due on the stock held by him." This
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relationship arises the moment the dividend is declared and segregated,
and the statute of limitations runs against a stockholder in an action

to recover dividends which have been declared. 11 FETOHER, CYCLOPEDIA
ConoRATIoNs (Perm. ed. 1933) § 5370; Bryon v. Welch, 74 F. (2d)
964 (1934); Ford v. Snoolc, 205 App. Div. 194, 199 N. Y. S. 630 (1923);
In re Booth's Estate, 139 Misc. Rep. 253, 248 N. Y. S. 264 (1931); Bishop
v. Bishop, 81 Conn. 509, Atl. 583 (1909); Hunt v. O'Shea, 69 N. H. 600,
45 At]. 480 (1899). The stockholder's remedy against a corporation that
refuses to pay dividends which have -been declared is an action at law
for their collection. In re Sutherland, 23 F. (2d) 595 (1928).
In the case of preferred stock the result is the same, and as to declared dividends the stockholder bringing an action for their recovery
is deemed a creditor of the corporation. Miller v. M. E. Smith Bldg. Co.,
118 Neb. 5, 223 N. W. 277, 280 (1929).
See 11 FLETCHER, CYcLoPEDi.
ConPonATioNS (Perm. ed. 1933) § 5293.
In a debtor-creditor relationship the debtor does not owe the creditor
particular money but any money, and hence can not be said to be a trustee. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AwD TRUSTEES (1935) § 7; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(1935) § 12.
But, where a dividend has been declared and following such declaration there Is a definite fund created out of which the dividends are to
be paid, the fund which Is so set apart then becomes a trust fund. 1
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 20; 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CoRponATioNS (Perm. ed. 1933) § 5366. In re Interborough Consol. Corporation, 267 Fed. 914 (1920) held that when a dividend is declared and
a fund set aside out of which it is to be paid the debtor-creditor relation
which formerly existed is transformed into a trust. See also In re Le
Blanc, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 8, ajfd. 75 N. Y. 599 (1878). Accord: Le Boy
v. Globe Inc. Co., 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 657 (1836); Van Dyck v. McQuade,
86 N. Y. 38, 52 (1881); Ford v. Easthampton Rubber Tread Co., 158 Mass.
84, 32 N. E. 1036, 20 L. R. A. 65, 35 Am. St. Rep. 426 (1893); Staats V.
Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454, 458, 149 C. C. A. 506, L. R. A. 1917B, 728.
In determining if the fund so set apart is a trust the distinguishing
feature is whether the fund is subject to the control of the corporation
otherwise than for the payment for which it was created. In. re Interborough Consol. Corporation,288 Fed. 334, 344, 32 A. L. R. 932 (1923).
A problem presented in the instant case is whether the payment of the
declared dividends to a third person under a mistake of fact was equivalent to a setting aside of a separate "dividend account" so as to bring
the decision within the rule of the Interborough Consol. Corporation
case, supra, 267 Fed. 914 (1920).
It could very well be reasoned that there is no material difference
-between a situation where a separate dividend fund is first created and
then payment made to a third person out of that fund, and the situation,
as in the instant ease, where the payment was made directly to the third
person. If the Colorado court had based its result on this approach, or
if they in fact found that a separate dividend fund had been set aside
then there would be no question raised as to the soundness of the decision.
The declared dividends would then have become a trust fund, and the
statute of limitations could not be invoked as a defense to an action
for their recovery.
Either the court should have found that a declared dividend fund
had 'been set aside against which the statute could not run, or they should
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have found that it was merely a declared dividend against which the
statute had run. However, to reason that declared dividends are held in
trust by the corporation in the same manner as ordinary stock, without
determining whether a separate and distinct fund has been set aside
with which to pay them, seems unwarranted and contrary to the rule
expressed by the majority of courts.
J. P. H.
POSSESSOR OF BUSINESS PREMISES-DUTY TO CONTROL THIRD PERSONS.
The plaintiff, a customer in the defendant's store, was struck and injured
by a tricycle owned by the defendant, but operated by a child. Sustaining
a nonsuit, the court found no evidence of negligence on the part of the
defendant; no evidence of placing the child upon the tricycle, or in leaving the tricycle in such a position as to invite its appropriation. Barnes
v. J. C. P'nney Co., 190 Wash. 633, 70 P. (2d) 311 (1937).
The possessor of business premises will be subject to liability to invitees for bodily harm caused to them by the accidental, negligent, or
intentional acts of third persons or animals if the possessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered that such acts were being
done or were about to be done, and could have protected them by controlling the conduct of the third persons. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
§ 348.
Thus, each case necessarily turns upon its own facts, the question
being whether the defendant was negligent in the exercise of the control
over others which, as possessor, he was bound to use for the safety of
the plaintiff. Accordingly, similar cases can be merely suggestive. In
the following cases the defendant was found to have been negligent:
Exton v. Central By. of New Jersey, 662 N. J. L. 7, 42 Atl. 486, 56 A. L. R.
508 (1899) (scuffling backmen in depot); Kuhlen v. Boston d N. St. By.
Co., 193 Mass. 341, 79 N. E. 815 (1907) (jostling passengers); Dafur V.
Boston & M. By. Co., 75 Vt. 165, 53 Atl. 1068 (1903) (passenger in car
struck by bullet from rifle range on defendant's property); Muhlhause
v. Monongahela St. By. Co., 201 Pa. 237, 50 Atl. 937 (1902) (jostling
passengers); Greeley v. Miller's, Inc., 111 Conn. 584, 150 Atl. 500 (1930)
(injury by crowd at sale); Mastad.v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 85
N. W. 913, 85 A. S. R. 440, 53 L. R. A. 803 (1901) (battery by intoxicated
customer).
However, in the succeeding cases the defendant was found not to
have been negligent: Ellinger v. Philadelphia W. B. By. Co., 153 Pa. St.
213, 25 Atl. 1132 (1893) (jostled off car by fellow passengers); Graef v.
PhiladelphiaR. R. Co., 161 Pa. St. 230, 28 At. 1107 (1894) (struck by
the car door pushed open violently by another passenger); Noonan v.
Sheridan, 230 Ky. 162, 18 S. W. (2d) 976 (1929) (boys playing in store
toppled linoleum); Crump v. Hellans, (Tex. Civ. App.) 41 S. W. (2d)
288 (1931) (bumped by refrigerator door opened by another customer).
It is often said that one should not be liable for injuries caused by
the independent action of a third party. Barnes v. J. C. Peney Co.,
supra; Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331, 106 N. E. 837,
L. R. A. 1915C 460 (1914). But this is a neat descriptive summary of the
result in the particular case rather than a formula for Its solution. If
by the eye of reasonable vigilance the "independent action" could have
been foreseen, and by reasonable care controlled, the defendant pos-
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sessor will -be subject to liability, Greeley v. Miller's Inc., supra. "Independent action" means, in reality, "unforeseeable action", and thus
phrased has less tendency to mislead. As the rule is applied in the instant
case, the conduct of the child on the tricycle was "independent" only
in -the sense that the evidence failed to show the J. C. Penney Company
negligent in not anticipating or discovering his use of it in the aisle.
H. M. T.
WILLs-CosTucTioN
OF STATUTE-PRETERITTED
HEms.
Testatrix
executed a non-intervention will on October 7, 1925, in which she named
her five children and then declared that she would "make no provision
as to them, knowing that my said husband will deal justly with them."
One of the five children named died, after the execution of the will, on
July 26, 1929, survived by his wife, P, and their four minor children,
one of 'whom was alive when this will was executed. Testatrix died
April 16, 1936, without changing her will. This action was brought by
the mother and guardian of the four minor children to have an undivided
one-fifth interest in the estate of the testatrix distributed to her children
as pretermitted heirs under the statute (REm. REv. STAT. § 1402; Pierce,
§ 10029). Held: For D, executor; that the testatrix having named her
son in her will, is not to be deemed to have died intestate as to any
of his children even though he was deceased at the time of the death
of the testatrix. In re Phillips Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P. (2d) 1015
(1938).
This court has declared that the purpose of this statute is to provide
against unintentional disinheritance of any child or descendant by the
inadvertence of the testator. In Re Harpers Estate, 168 Wash. 101,
10 P. (2d) 991 (1932). It Is not to compel the testator to make some
provision for his descendants nor to prevent him from disinheriting any
of them. Gehlen. v. GehZen, 77 Wash. 17, 137 Pac. 312 (1913). Thus,
when the omission appears to be intentional and not by lapse of memory,
the statute will not apply.
In the instant case, the Washington court for the first time construes
REm. REV. STAT. § 1402 as to the failure to name descendatnts whose
deceased parent is named. Arriving at a sound result, it is submitted
that the court confines itself to a strict interpretation of the statute when
a similar result could be reached by adopting a less technical approach.
The legislature in 1917 (REm. REv. STAT. § 1402) omitted the phrase
"or .their descendants" in the clause which prior to that time had read"every such testator, as to such child or children or their descendants
not provided for, shall .be deemed to die intestate." REm. AwD BALL. CODE
(1910) § 1326; see LAws oF 1917, Chap. 156, § 233, at p. 707. The court
found the omission to be intentional and hence that "the testatrix is
deemed to die Intestate only as to her child or children not named or
provided for." Since her child here was named, the statute Is inoperative. The words "child" and "descendants" are not synonymous, said
the court, citing Turner v. Monteiro, 127 Va. 537, 103 S. E. 572, 13 A. L. R.
383 (1920).
It would seem that the same result as that reached In the instant
case could be attained by reading REm. REV. STAT. § 1402 and REM. REV.
STAT. § 1404 in conjunction with each other. By § 1404, 'where a child
named as devisee predeceases the testator, the lineal descendants of the
child take that estate which the child would have taken. Thus, when
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the named child Is disinherited, the descendants of such child should
also be considered as disinherited unless a contrary intention appears In
the will. The intention of the testator is to be determined as of the date
of the execution of the will. O'Shaughnessy v. Brooks, 153 Wash. 247,
279 Pac. 591 (1929); In Re Tremens Estate, 152 Wash. 82, 277 Pac. 383, 68
A. L. R. 753 (1929) ; Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253, 227 Pac. 6 (1924) ;
In Re Lotzgesell's Estate, 62 Wash. 352, 113 Pac. 1105 (1911). Here at the
time of executing her will, the testatrix must have had in mind the
children of her named child since one was living at that time.
Missouri has a statute which "in all material respects" is Identical
to the Washington "pretermitted heir" statute as it stood prior to the
change of 1917. Gehlen v. Gehlen, 77 Wash. 17, 137 Pac. 312 (1913);
REV. STAT. OF MISSOURI, 1929, § 525, p. 304.
Also, REm. REv. STAT. § 1404
and Missouri statute § 527 are the same. The Missouri court has
adopted the view advanced in this note, irrespective of the fact that the
phrase "or their descendants", as now omitted from the Washington
statute, is present in the Missouri statute. In a decision "written by
one of its greatest jurists", the Missouri court held that a mention in
the will of a deceased daughter of the testator was sufficient to show
that he had not forgotten her children. Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408
(1853). This view in Missouri is founded on the theory-"Whenever the
mention of one person by the natural association of ideas suggests another, it may reasonably be inferred that the latter was in the mind of
the testator and was not forgotten or unintentionally omitted." Guitar
v. Gordon, supra; Fugate v. Allen, 119 Mo. Appeals 183, 95 S. W. 980
(1906); Laumick v. Schultz (Mo. 1930), 28 S. W. (2d) 658. Since the
Washington court recognized this "Missouri doctrine" without adopting
or repudiating it, In Re Harper's Estate, 168 Wash. 98, 10 P. (2d) 991
(1932), when the court thought the respective statutes of the two states
were "in all material respects the same", it would not be too forward a
step for Washington to adopt this view.
W. J. W.

